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Abstract. Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever
the preferences of all voters of a society belong to this set, their majority relation has no
cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, every such domain can be assumed to
be closed in the sense that it contains the majority relation of every profile with an odd
number of voters whose preferences belong to this domain.
We show that every closed Condorcet domain can be endowed with the structure of
a median graph and that, conversely, every median graph is associated with a closed
Condorcet domain (in general, not uniquely). Condorcet domains that have linear graphs
(chains) associated with them are exactly the preference domains with the classical single-
crossing property. As a corollary, we obtain that a domain with the so-called ‘representa-
tive voter property’ is either a single-crossing domain or a very special domains containing
exactly four different preference orders whose associated median graph is a 4-cycle.
Maximality of a Condorcet domain imposes additional restrictions on the associated
median graph. We prove that among all trees only (some) chains can be associated graphs
of maximal Condorcet domains, and we characterize those single-crossing domains which
are maximal Condorcet domains.
Finally, using the characterization of Nehring and Puppe [2007] of monotone Arrovian
aggregation, our analysis yields a rich class of strategy-proof social choice functions on
any closed Condorcet domain.
JEL Classification D71, C72
Keywords: Social choice, Condorcet domains, acyclic sets of linear orders, median
graphs, single-crossing property, distributive lattice, Arrovian aggregation, strategy-proof-
ness, intermediate preferences.
1 Introduction
The problem of finding and characterizing preference domains on which pairwise majority
voting never admits cycles—the so-called Condorcet domains—has a long history in social
choice theory. In their seminal contributions, Black [1948] and Arrow [1951] noticed
that the domain of all linear preference orders that are single-peaked with respect to
some underlying linear spectrum form a Condorcet domain. Later, Sen [1966] provided
a characterization of Condorcet domains in terms of the well-known condition of value
restriction. Since this early work some progress has been made in understanding the
structure of Condorcet domains; see Abello [1991, 2004], Chameni-Nembua [1989], Danilov
et al. [2012], Danilov and Koshevoy [2013], Fishburn [1997, 2002], Galambos and Reiner
[2008] for important contributions, and Monjardet [2009] for an excellent survey. However,
with the exception of Danilov and Koshevoy [2013], the bulk of the results established
in the literature pertains only to the special case of connected domains. The analysis
of Danilov and Koshevoy [2013], on the other hand, is confined to the case of ‘normal’
Condorcet domains that contain at least one pair of completely reversed orders.
The present paper provides a unifying general approach by establishing a close connec-
tion between Condorcet domains and median graphs (see a comprehensive survey about
these in Klavzar and Mulder [1999]) on the one hand, and the well-studied class of single-
crossing domains on the other hand; see Roberts [1977], Gans and Smart [1996], Saporiti
[2009], among others.
First, we observe that if a Condorcet domain of linear preference orders admits a
profile with an odd number of voters whose (transitive) majority relation does not belong
to this domain, then we can add this majority relation to the Condorcet domain and
obtain a larger Condorcet domain. We may thus assume without loss of generality that
Condorcet domains are closed in the sense that pairwise majority voting among an odd
number of individuals always yields an order within the given domain. In particular, all
maximal Condorcet domains are necessarily closed.
The concept of betweenness, introduced for linear orders by Kemeny [1959], plays a
major role in our analysis. An order is between two orders, or intermediate, if it agrees
with all binary comparisons in which the two linear orders agree, (see also Kemeny and
Snell [1960], Grandmont [1978]). This allows us to associate a graph to any domain of
linear orders by calling two linear orders of this domain neighbors if there are no other
linear orders in this domain that are between them.
We show that (i) every closed Condorcet domain on a finite set of alternatives equipped
with the neighborhood relation is isomorphic to a median graph, and (ii) for every finite
median graph there exists a set of alternatives and a closed Condorcet domain whose graph
is isomorphic to the given median graph. Importantly, the median graph corresponding
to a Condorcet domain is in general not a subgraph of the permutohedron, which is the
graph associated with the universal domain of all strict linear orders (see Section 3 below
for detailed explanation)1.
1The permutohedron was defined in Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl [1963] as a polytope. It can also be
viewed as a graph in which two vertices are neighbors if they are joined by an edge (which is the 1-skeleton
of that polytope). Monjardet [2009] calls it permutoe`dre graph.
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Our analysis is related to the prior work by Nehring and Puppe [2007] and Demange
[2012]. Nehring and Puppe [2007] introduce a general notion of a median space and
demonstrate its usefulness in aggregation theory; we comment on the relation to their
work in detail below. Demange [2012] shows that, if it is possible to assign linear orders
of a certain domain to the vertices of a median graph in such a way that intermediate
orders lie on a shortest path in the graph, then the majority relation of any profile with
preferences from this domain admits no cycles. However, Demange [2012] takes both
the median graph and the preference profile as given and does not address the issue
under which conditions the required construction can indeed be carried out. Part (i) of
our aforementioned result shows that, in fact, every closed Condorcet domain (with its
respective neighborhood relation) is isomorphic to a median graph. The analysis of the
present paper thus demonstrates that Demange’s requirement of the existence of a median
graph is not only sufficient but also necessary for a domain of preferences to admit an
acyclic majority relation for all profiles.
The close connection between Condorcet domains and median graphs established here
allows one to apply results from the theory of median graphs to shed further light on
the structure of Condorcet domains. For instance, as a simple corollary of our analysis
we obtain that all closed Condorcet domains that contain two completely reversed linear
orders are distributive lattices. This important fact was first established for connected
maximal Condorcet domains by Chameni-Nembua [1989] and Abello [1991], and then for
all maximal Condorcet domains by Danilov and Koshevoy [2013] who used a different
technique. Here we show this for the much larger class of all closed (but not necessarily
maximal) Condorcet domains.
While all median graphs give rise to closed Condorcet domains, not all of them corre-
spond to a maximal Condorcet domain. It turns out that in fact certain types of median
graphs never enable maximality of the respective Condorcet domains. In particular, we
prove that among all trees only (some) chains are associated with maximal Condorcet
domains.
Condorcet domains, whose median graphs are chains, have been studied quite exten-
sively in economics under the name of single-crossing domains. They are characterized
by the single-crossing property which stipulates that the orders of the domain can be ar-
ranged in a chain so that, for any ordered pair of alternatives, the set of all orders that
rank one alternative strictly above the other form an interval in this chain. It is well-
known that single-crossing domains have the representative voter property (cf. Rothstein
[1991]), i.e., in any profile with an odd number of voters whose preferences belong to
the given domain there is one voter whose preference order coincides with the majority
relation. We show here that the representative voter property essentially characterizes
the class of single-crossing domains.2
A maximal single-crossing domain must obviously contain two completely reversed
orders. Interestingly, not all maximal single-crossing domains are maximal Condorcet
domains, i.e., typically it is possible to add further preference orders to a maximal single-
2The only exceptions are the domains with exactly four elements such that the associated graph is a
4-cycle; these also satisfy the representative voter property.
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crossing domain without generating cycles in the majority relation of any profile. Here,
we provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition of when a maximal single-crossing
domain is also a maximal Condorcet domain. The condition requires that the ‘switched’
pairs of alternatives associated with any two consecutive orders of the domain have one
element in common.
Our analysis immediately implies that the closed Condorcet domains are exactly the
median stable subsets of the space of all linear orders on a given set of alternatives. It thus
follows from the results of Nehring and Puppe [2007, 2010] that closed Condorcet domains
not only enable pairwise majority voting as a consistent aggregation method but in fact
admit a wide range of further aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s independence condition.
We adapt their characterization of all monotone Arrovian aggregators to the case of
Condorcet domains of linear orders and show that every monotone Arrovian aggregator
on a closed Condorcet domain induces a strategy-proof social choice function on the same
domain. For each Condorcet domain, we thus obtain a rich class of strategy-proof voting
rules, of which the rules identified by Saporiti [2009] for single-crossing domains are special
cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following Section 2, we
introduce the concept of a Condorcet domain and observe some of its fundamental prop-
erties. In particular, we show that closed Condorcet domains are exactly the median
stable subsets of the space of all linear preference orders on a given set of alternatives.
Section 3 introduces median graphs and states our main result establishing the corre-
spondence between closed Condorcet domains and median graphs. Section 4 provides the
characterization of single-crossing domains, and discusses a weaker version of the single-
crossing property, namely single-crossingness on trees. Section 5 addresses maximality of
Condorcet domains, an issue that has already received attention in the literature (cf. Mon-
jardet [2009]). In particular, we prove that trees different from chains are never associated
with maximal Condorcet domains, and we characterize the chains (i.e. single-crossing do-
mains) that correspond to maximal Condorcet domains. Any maximal single-crossing
domain necessarily contains two completely reversed orders; this does not hold for all
maximal Condorcet domains as we show by means of an example. In Section 6, we adapt
the characterization of all monotone Arrovian aggregators obtained in Nehring and Puppe
[2007] to the case of (closed) Condorcet domains and show how it induces a large class
of strategy-proof social choice functions on any such domain. An appendix briefly re-
views the theory of geometric interval operators (see, e.g. van de Vel [1993]) and contains
the proof of the central Lemma 3.1 using the so-called triangle condition introduced by
Bandelt and Chepoi [1996].
2 Closed Condorcet Domains as the Median Stable
Subsets of the Universal Domain
In this section, we show that the class of domains that are closed under taking the major-
ity relation for all profiles with an odd number of voters are precisely the median stable
subsets of the space of linear orders endowed with the Kemeny betweenness relation. A
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majority of results in this section are not original. In Theorem 1 we gathered a number
of classical characterisations of Condorcet domains and Theorem 2 can be derived from
the analysis in Nehring and Puppe [2007] who investigated a more general class of median
spaces. Nevertheless, we believe that our exposition and the short proof of the funda-
mental characterization result, Theorem 2 below, will help to clarify and unify several
different approaches in the literature.
2.1 Condorcet Domains
Consider a finite set of alternativesX and the setR(X) of all (strict) linear orders (i.e., com-
plete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations) on X which we will refer to as the
universal domain. Any subset D ⊆ R(X) will be called a domain of preferences or simply
a domain. A profile ρ = (R1, . . . , Rn) over D is an element of the Cartesian product Dn
for some number n ∈ N of ‘voters’, where the linear order Ri represents the preferences
of the ith voter over the alternatives from X. A profile with an odd number of voters will
simply be referred to as an odd profile. Frequently, we will denote linear orders simply
by listing the alternatives in the order of decreasing preference, e.g., a linear order that
ranks a first, b second, c third, etc., is denoted by abc . . ..
The majority relation associated with a profile ρ is the binary relation Pmajρ on X such
that xPmajρ y if and only if more than half of the voters rank x above y. Note that,
according to this definition, the majority relation is asymmetric and, for any odd profile
ρ and any two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X, we have either xPmajρ y or yPmajρ x. An
asymmetric binary relation P is acyclic if there does not exist a subset {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X
such that x1Px2, x2Px3, . . . , xm−1Pxm and xmPx1. The class of all domains D ⊆ R(X)
such that, for all n, the majority relation associated with any profile ρ ∈ Dn is acyclic
has received significant attention in the literature, see the survey of Monjardet [2009] and
the references therein. In the following, we will refer to any such domain as a Condorcet
domain.3
The following result prepares the ground for our analysis, providing some well-known
characterizations of Condorcet domains (cf. [Monjardet, 2009, p. 142]). In particular,
condition d) below is Sen’s [1966] ‘value restriction’; condition e) has been introduced
by Ward [1965] as the ‘absence of a Latin square’ (in other terminology, it requires the
absence of a ‘Condorcet cycle’; cf. Condorcet [1785]).
Theorem 1. Let X be finite, and let D ⊆ R(X) be a subset of the space of all linear
orders on X. The following statements are equivalent:
a) D is a Condorcet domain, i.e., the majority relation corresponding to every profile
over D is acyclic.
b) For every profile over D, the corresponding majority relation is a strict partial order
(i.e.,transitive and asymmetric binary relation).
3Fishburn [1997] calls them acyclic sets of linear orders.
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c) For every odd profile over D, the corresponding majority relation is a linear order,
i.e., an element of R(X).
d) For every triple x, y, z ∈ X of pairwise distinct alternatives, there exists one element
in {x, y, z} that is either never ranked first, or never ranked second, or never ranked
third in all restrictions of the orders in D to the set {x, y, z}.
e) For no triple R1, R2, R3 ∈ D, and no triple x, y, z ∈ X of pairwise distinct alterna-
tives one has xR1yR1z, yR2zR2x and zR3xR3y simultaneously.
We will say that a Condorcet domain D is closed if the majority relation corresponding
to any odd profile over D is again an element of D, and we will say that a Condorcet
domain D is maximal if no Condorcet domain (over the same set of alternatives) is a
proper superset of D. The following simple observation will be very useful.
Lemma 2.1. Let D be a Condorcet domain and R ∈ R(X) be the majority relation
corresponding to an odd profile over D. Then D ∪ {R} is again a Condorcet domain. In
particular, every Condorcet domain is contained in a closed Condorcet domain.
Proof. By Theorem 1e), it suffices to show that D ∪ {R} does not admit three orders
R1, R2, R3 and three elements x, y, z ∈ X such that xR1yR1z, yR2zR2x and zR3xR3y.
Assume on the contrary that it does; then, evidently, not all three orders R1, R2, R3
belong to D. Thus, one of them, say R3, is the majority relation of an odd profile ρ ∈ Dn,
i.e. R3 = R. Consider the profile ρ
′ = (nR1, nR2, ρ) ∈ D3n that consists of n voters
having the order R1, n voters having the order R2 and the n voters of the profile ρ.
Then the voters of the subprofile (nR1, nR2) will unanimously prefer y to z, which forces
the majority relation Pmajρ′ corresponding to ρ
′ to have the same ranking of y and z. At
the same time, the voters of this subprofile are evenly split in the ranking of any other
pair of alternatives from {x, y, z}. Hence, the majority relation Pmajρ′ yields the cycle
zPmajρ′ xP
maj
ρ′ yP
maj
ρ′ z, in contradiction to the assumption that D is a Condorcet domain. 2
This observation allows us to concentrate our attention on closed Condorcet domains
without loss of generality, and we do so for the rest of the paper. Note, in particular, that
by Lemma 2.1 all maximal Condorcet domains are closed.
2.2 Betweenness and Median Domains
The universal domain R(X) can be endowed with the ternary relation of ‘Kemeny be-
tweenness’ [Kemeny, 1959]. According to it, an order Q is between orders R and R′ if
Q ⊇ R ∩ R′, i.e., Q agrees with all binary comparisons on which R and R′ agree.4 The
set of all orders that are between R and R′ is called the interval spanned by R and R′ and
is denoted by [R,R′]. This interval operator makes R(X) an interval space [van de Vel,
1993].5
4Some authors such as, e.g., Grandmont [1978] and Demange [2012] refer to orders that are between
two others in this sense as ‘intermediate’ orders.
5 For a closer analysis of this interval operator, see the appendix.
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A subset D ⊆ R(X) is called median stable if, for any triple of elements R1, R2, R3 ∈ D,
there exists an element Rmed = Rmed(R1, R2, R3) ∈ D, the median order corresponding to
R1, R2, R3, such that
Rmed ∈ [R1, R2] ∩ [R1, R3] ∩ [R2, R3].
Proposition 2.1. The median order of a triple R1, R2, R3 ∈ R(X), if exists, is unique.
Proof. If a triple R1, R2, R3 admits two different median orders, say R and R
′, these
must differ on the ranking of at least one pair of alternatives. Suppose they disagree on
the ranking of x and y. In this case, not all three orders of the triple agree on the ranking
of x versus y. Hence, exactly two of them, say R1 and R2, must agree on the ranking of
x versus y; but then, either R or R′ is not between R1 and R2, a contradiction. 2
In the following, we will refer to median stable subsets of R(X) as median domains.
Evidently, not every subset of R(X) is a median domain; for instance, the universal
domain R(X) itself is not a median domain whenever |X| ≥ 3. This can be verified by
considering any three orders of the form R1 = . . . a . . . b . . . c . . ., R2 = . . . b . . . c . . . a . . .,
and R3 = . . . c . . . a . . . b . . .. Since any linear order R in [R1, R3] has aRb, any linear
order R in [R1, R2] has bRc, and any linear order R in [R2, R3] has cRa, we obtain
[R1, R2]∩ [R1, R3]∩ [R2, R3] = ∅ due to the transitivity requirement. Prominent examples
of median domains include the well-studied single-crossing domains.
Example 1 (Classical single-crossing domains). There are several equivalent de-
scriptions of single-crossing domains (see, e.g., Gans and Smart [1996], Saporiti [2009]).
The following will be useful for our purpose. A domain D ⊆ R(X) is said to have the
single-crossing property if D can be linearly ordered, say according to R1 > R2 > . . . >
Rm, so that, for all pairs x, y of distinct elements of X, the sets {Rj ∈ D | xRjy} and
{Rj ∈ D | yRjx} are connected in the order >. Thus, for each pair x, y of distinct ele-
ments, there is exactly one ‘cut-off’ order Rk such that either (i) xRjy for all j ≤ k and
yRjx for all j > k, or (ii) yRjx for all j ≤ k and xRjy for all j > k. It is easily verified
that, for any triple with Ri > Rj > Rk the median order exists and coincides with the
‘middle’ order, i.e., Rmed(Ri, Rj, Rk) = Rj.
The close connection between Condorcet domains and median domains to be estab-
lished in Theorem 2 below stems from the following simple but fundamental observation
(cf. [Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Cor. 5]).
Observation. A triple R1, R2, R3 ∈ R(X) admits a median order if and only if the
majority relation of the profile ρ = (R1, R2, R3) is acyclic, in which case the median order
Rmed(R1, R2, R3) and the majority relation of ρ coincide.
Proof. If the majority relation Pmajρ is acyclic, and hence is an element of R(X), it
belongs to each interval [Ri, Rj] for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Indeed, if both Ri and Rj
rank x higher than y, then so does the majority relation. Conversely, if R is the median of
the triple R1, R2, R3, then for any pair x, y ∈ X, at least two orders from this triple agree
on ranking of x and y. Then R must agree with them, hence it is the majority relation
for the profile ρ = (R1, R2, R3). 2
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Corollary 2.1. Any closed Condorcet domain is a median domain.
Proof. Suppose D is a closed Condorcet domain, and let R1, R2, R3 be any triple of
orders from D. The majority relation R corresponding to the profile (R1, R2, R3) ∈ D3 by
Theorem 1c) is an element of R(X), and by the assumed closedness it is in fact an element
of D. By the preceding observation, R is the median order of the triple R1, R2, R3. 2
A subset C ⊆ D of a domain D ⊆ R(X) will be called convex if C contains with any
pair R,R′ ∈ C the entire interval spanned by R and R′, that is, C is convex if
{R,R′} ⊆ C ⇒ [R,R′] ⊆ C.
A family F of subsets of a set is said to have the Helly property if the sets in any
subfamily F′ ⊆ F have a non-empty intersection whenever their pairwise intersections are
non-empty, i.e., if C ∩C ′ 6= ∅ for each pair C, C ′ ∈ F′ implies ∩F′ 6= ∅. For us this property
will be important when F is the set of all convex subsets of a domain D ⊆ R(X).
Proposition 2.2 (Helly property and median domains). A domain D is a median
domain if and only if D has the Helly property for convex subsets.
Proof. Let D be median domain and F be a family of convex subsets with pairwise non-
empty intersection. We proceed by induction over m = |F|. If m = 2, there is nothing
to prove, thus let m = 3, i.e., F = {C1, C2, C3}. Choose any triple of orders R1 ∈ C1 ∩ C2,
R2 ∈ C2 ∩ C3 and R3 ∈ C3 ∩ C1, and consider the median order R = Rmed(R1, R2, R3).
By convexity of the sets C1, C2, C3 we have R ∈ C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3 which, in particular, shows
that ∩F is non-empty. Now consider F = {C1, . . . , Cm} with m > 3 elements, and assume
that the assertion holds for all families with less than m elements. Then, the family
{C1, C2, C3 ∩ . . . ∩ Cm} constitutes a family of three convex subsets with pairwise non-
empty intersections. By the preceding argument, we thus have ∩F 6= ∅.
Conversely, consider a domain D such that any family of convex subsets of D has the
Helly property. Consider any three orders R1, R2, R3 ∈ D. Since, evidently, all intervals
are convex, the Helly property applied to the intervals [R1, R2], [R1, R3], [R2, R3] implies
the existence of a median. 2
For any domain D and any pair x, y ∈ X of alternatives, denote by VDxy the set of
orders in D that rank x above y, i.e.,
VDxy := {R ∈ D | xRy}.
Note that, for all distinct x, y ∈ X, the sets VDxy and VDyx form a partition of D. Also
observe that the sets of the form VDxy are convex for all pairs x, y ∈ X. We will now use
the Helly property applied to this family of convex sets to show that every median domain
is a closed Condorcet domain. The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The classes of median domains and closed Condorcet domains coincide, i.e.,
a domain is a median domain if and only if it is a closed Condorcet domain.
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Proof. In the light of Corollary 2.1, it suffices to show that every median domain is a
closed Condorcet domain. Thus, let D be a median domain and consider an odd profile
ρ = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn. For any two alternatives x, y ∈ X, let Uxy = {Ri | xRiy},
and observe that obviously, Uxy ⊆ VDxy. Let z, w also be alternatives in X, not necessarily
distinct from x and y. If xPmajρ y and zP
maj
ρ w, then Uxy∩ Uzw 6= ∅ and hence VDxy∩VDzw 6= ∅.
By Proposition 2.2 we have ⋂
x,y∈X :xPmajρ y
VDxy 6= ∅,
hence there is a linear order in D which coincides with the majority relation of ρ. 2
3 Closed Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
The close relation between the majority relation and the median operator in closed Con-
dorcet domains suggests that there exists a deeper structural connection between closed
Condorcet domains and median graphs.6 The details of this connection are worked out
in this section. We start in Subsection 3.1 with some basic facts about median graphs.
In Subsection 3.2 we prove that the graph associated with any closed Condorcet domain
is a median graph. In Subsection 3.3 we show that, conversely, for every median graph
one can construct a (non-unique) closed Condorcet domain whose associated graph is
isomorphic to the given graph.
3.1 Median Graphs
Let Γ = (V,E) be a connected graph. The distance d(u, v) between two vertices u, v ∈ V
is the smallest number of edges that a path connecting u and v may contain. While the
distance is uniquely defined, there may be several shortest paths from u to v. We say that
a vertex w is geodesically between the vertices u and v if w lies on a shortest path that
connects u and v or, equivalently, if d(u, v) = d(u,w) + d(w, v). A (geodesically) convex
set in a graph Γ = (V,E) is a subset C ⊆ V such that for any two vertices u, v ∈ C
all vertices on every shortest path between u and v in Γ lie in C. A connected graph
Γ = (V,E) is called a median graph if, for any three vertices u, v, w ∈ V , there is a unique
vertex med(u, v, w) ∈ V which lies simultaneously on some shortest paths from u to v,
from u to w and from v to w.
To characterize the structure of an arbitrary median graph we recall the concept of
convex expansion. For any two subsets S, T ⊆ V of the set of vertices of the graph Γ, let
E(S, T ) ⊆ E denote the set of edges that connect vertices in S and vertices in T .
Definition 1. Let Γ = (V,E) be a graph. Let W1,W2 ⊂ V be two subsets with a non-
empty intersection W1 ∩W2 6= ∅ such that W1 ∪W2 = V and E(W1 \W2,W2 \W1) = ∅.
The expansion of Γ with respect to W1 and W2 is the graph Γ
′ constructed as follows:
6The term ‘median graph’ was coined by Nebesky´ [1971]; for a comprehensive survey on median graphs
see Klavzar and Mulder [1999].
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Figure 1: Convex expansion of a median graph
• each vertex v ∈ W1 ∩W2 is replaced by two vertices v1, v2 joined by an edge;
• v1 is joined to all the neighbors of v in W1 \W2 and v2 is joined to all the neighbors
of v in W2 \W1;
• if v, w ∈ W1 ∩W2 and vw ∈ E, then v1 is joined to w1 and v2 is joined to w2;
• if v, w ∈ W1 \W2 or if v, w ∈ W2 \W1, they will be joined by an edge in Γ′ if and
only if they were joined in Γ; if v ∈ W1 \W2 and w ∈ W2 \W1, they remain not
joined in Γ′.
If W1 and W2 are convex, then Γ
′ will be called a convex expansion of Γ.
Example 2 (Convex expansion). In the graph Γ shown on the left of Figure 1 we
set W1 = {a, b, c, d} and W2 = {c, d, e, f}. These are convex and their intersection
W1 ∩W2 = {c, d} is not empty. On the right we see the graph Γ′ obtained by the convex
expansion of Γ with respect to W1 and W2.
The following important theorem about median graphs is due to Mulder [1978].
Theorem 3 (Mulder’s convex expansion theorem). A graph is median if and only
if it can be obtained from a trivial one-vertex graph by repeated convex expansions.
3.2 Every Closed Condorcet Domain Induces a Median Graph
As we already said in the introduction, with every domain D ⊆ R(X) one can associate
a graph ΓD on D as follows. Two distinct orders R,R′ ∈ D are said to be neighbors in D,
or simply D-neighbors, if [R,R′] ∩ D = {R,R′}. Define ΓD to be the (undirected) graph
on D that connects each pair of D-neighbors by an edge. We say that ΓD is the associated
graph of D. We recall that the graph associated with the universal domain R(X) is called
the permutohedron. Note that the graph ΓD is always connected, i.e., any two orders in D
are connected by a path in ΓD. Moreover, any two R(X)-neighbors R,R′ are always D-
neighbors whenever R,R′ ∈ D. However, two D-neighbors need not be R(X)-neighbors,
so, if D 6= R(X), the associated graph ΓD need not be a subgraph of the permutohedron.
If it is, the domain D is called connected.7
7Since connectedness of a domain is thus not the same as connectedness of the associated graph, the
terminology might be a bit confusing. But it is widely accepted in the literature [Monjardet, 2009].
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We will now define another concept of betweenness, different from the Kemeny one.
For any D ⊆ R(X), the order Q ∈ D is ΓD-geodesically between the orders R,R′ ∈ D if
Q lies on a shortest ΓD-path that connects R and R′.
As a first example, consider Figure 2 which depicts two single-crossing domains on
the set X = {a, b, c} with their corresponding graphs. The domain on the left is D1 =
{abc, acb, cab, cba}, the domain on the right is D2 = {abc, bac, bca, cba}.
Figure 2: Two single-crossing domains on {a, b, c} with their associated graphs
Note that the permutohedron is given by the entire 6-cycle, and that the graphs asso-
ciated with the two single-crossing domains are linear subgraphs of the permutohedron.
In particular, both domains are connected and the Kemeny betweenness relation on D1
and D2 translates into the geodesic betweenness of their associated graphs.
It is important to note that for an arbitrary domain D both of these properties may not
be true: neither is ΓD in general a subgraph of ΓR(X), nor do the Kemeny betweenness onD
and the geodesic betweenness on ΓD correspond to each other. To illustrate this, consider
the three domains with their associated graphs depicted in Figure 3. Evidently, none of
the three graphs is a subgraph of the permutohedron, hence none of the corresponding
domains is connected. As is easily verified, the domain {abc, acb, cba, bca} on the left of
Figure 3 is a median domain, but the two other domains are not; for instance, the domain
{abc, cab, cba, bca} in the middle of Figure 3 contains a cyclic triple of orders abc, bca and
cab, and the 5-element domain {acb, cab, cba, bca, bac} on the right of Figure 3 contains
the cyclic triple acb, cba and bac.
Figure 3: Three domains on {a, b, c} with their associated graphs
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In case of the domain on the left-hand side, the Kemeny betweenness on D and the
geodesic betweenness on the associated graph ΓD agree. By contrast, for the domain in
the middle we have abc 6∈ [cab, bca] but evidently abc is geodesically between the orders
cab and bca in the associated graph. On the other hand, in this example the Kemeny
betweenness implies geodesic betweenness. But this also does not hold in general, as the
domain on the right of Figure 3 shows: here, both orders cab and cba are elements of
[acb, bca], but neither of them is geodesically between acb and bca.
For any domain D ⊆ R(X), we now have two betweenness relations on D: the Kemeny
betweenness and the geodesic betweenness in the associated graph ΓD. We will show that
in important cases they coincide, in which case for all R,R′, Q ∈ D, we have
Q ∈ [R,R′] ⇔ Q is ΓD-geodesically between R and R′. (3.1)
The following lemma is central to our approach. It states that the Kemeny betweenness
on a domain coincides with the geodesic betweenness of its associated graph for three
natural classes of domains: (i) median domains, (ii) connected domains, and (iii) domains
for which the associated graph is acyclic.
Lemma 3.1. The Kemeny betweenness on a domain D ⊆ R(X) coincides with the
geodesic betweenness of the associated graph ΓD, if one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
(i) D is a median domain,
(ii) D is connected,
(iii) ΓD is acyclic (i.e., a tree).
The proof of this lemma is provided in the appendix and invokes a general result on
‘geometric interval operators’ satisfying the so-called triangle condition due to Bandelt
and Chepoi [1996].
From Theorem 2 and Lemma 3.1(i), we immediately obtain the central result of this
section.
Theorem 4. The associated graph ΓD of any closed Condorcet domain D is a median
graph. Moreover, the Kemeny betweenness relation on D coincides with the geodesic
betweenness on ΓD.
We again stress that not all median domains are connected, as exemplified by the
domain on the left-hand-side of Figure 3. It is also worth noting that Lemma 3.1 does not
imply that D is a median domain whenever the associated graph ΓD is median graph. A
counterexample is the domain D in the middle of Figure 3, which is not a median domain
despite the fact that its graph ΓD is a median graph. However, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Let D ⊆ R(X) be a connected domain. Then, D is a median domain if
and only if the associated graph ΓD is a median graph.
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Proof. The associated graph of any median domain is a median graph by Lemma 3.1(i).
Conversely, if D is connected the geodesic median of any triple of vertices with respect to
ΓD is also the median with respect to the Kemeny betweenness in D by Lemma 3.1(ii).
Thus, if ΓD is a median graph, D is a median domain. 2
As another important corollary of our analysis, we obtain that all closed Condorcet
domains that contain two completely reversed orders have the structure of a distributive
lattice. Say that two orders R,R ∈ R(X) are completely reversed if R ∩R = {(x, x) | x ∈
X}, i.e., if R and R agree on the ranking of no pair of distinct alternatives.
Corollary 3.2. Let D be a closed Condorcet domain. If D contains at least two completely
reversed orders, then it is a distributive lattice.
Proof. By Theorem 4, the graph ΓD associated with D is a median graph. Let R,R ∈ D
be two completely reversed orders, and define the join and meet operations on D by
R ∨ R′ := Rmed(R,R,R′) and R ∧ R′ := Rmed(R,R,R′), respectively. It is easy (though
tedious) to verify that with these operations the space D has the structure of a distributive
lattice. Another way to prove the corollary is by invoking a well-known result by Avann
[1961] which states that a median graph is (the covering graph of) a distributive lattice
if and only if it contains two vertices, say 1 and 0, such that every vertex is on a shortest
path connecting 1 and 0. If one takes 1 to be R and 0 to be R, it is easily seen using
Lemma 3.1(i) that ΓD satisfies all premises of Avann’s result. 2
Remark. Chameni-Nembua [1989] and Abello [1991] have shown that all maximal and
connected Condorcet domains that contain at least two completely reversed orders have
the structure of a distributive lattice. This result was generalized by Danilov and Ko-
shevoy [2013] who showed that the connectedness is in fact not needed for the conclusion.
Corollary 3.2 further generalizes this by showing that the condition of maximality can be
substantially weakened to the condition of closedness. In fact, even without the closedness
condition, one would still obtain that every Condorcet domain that contains two com-
pletely reversed orders can be embedded in a distributive lattice. On the other hand, the
condition that the domain contain at least one pair of completely reversed orders cannot
be dropped (an example illustrating this is given in Figure 8 below).
3.3 Every Median Graph is Associated with a Closed Condorcet
Domain
Is every median graph induced by some closed Condorcet domain? The following result
gives an affirmative answer. Interestingly, we will see later in Section 5, that the answer
becomes negative if we insist on maximality of the Condorcet domain, i.e., there exist
median graphs that cannot be associated with any maximal Condorcet domain.
Theorem 5. For every (finite) median graph Γ = (V,E) there exists a closed Condorcet
domain D ⊆ R(Y ) on a finite set of alternatives Y with |Y | ≤ |V | such that ΓD is
isomorphic to Γ.
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Proof. We apply Mulder’s theorem. Since the statement is true for the trivial graph
consisting of a single vertex, arguing by induction, we assume that the statement is true
for all median graphs with k vertices or less. Let Γ′ = (V ′, E ′) be a median graph with
|V ′| = k + 1. By Mulder’s theorem Γ′ is a convex expansion of some median graph
Γ = (V,E) relative to convex subsets W1 and W2, where |V | = ` ≤ k. By induction
there exists a domain D ⊆ R(X) with |X| ≤ k such that ΓD is isomorphic to Γ with the
mapping R : v 7→ Rv associating a linear order Rv ∈ D to a vertex v ∈ V .
To obtain a new domain D′ such that ΓD′ is isomorphic to Γ′ we clone an arbitrary
alternative x ∈ X and introduce a clone8 y /∈ X of x and denote X ′ = X ∪ {y}. The
mapping R′ : v 7→ R′v that associates any vertex v ∈ Γ′ to a linear order R′v over X ′ will
be constructed as follows. If v is a vertex of W1 \W2, to obtain R′v we replace x with xy
in Rv, placing x higher than y, and to obtain R
′
u for u ∈ W2 \W1 we replace x by yx
in Ru, placing y higher than x. Let v now be in W1 ∩W2. In the convex expansion this
vertex is split into v1 and v2. To obtain R′v1 we clone the linear order Rv replacing x by
xy and to obtain R′v2 we clone the same linear order Rv replacing x by yx. The number
of alternatives has increased by one only, so it is not greater than |V ′| = `+ 1 ≤ k + 1.
To prove that ΓD′ is isomorphic to Γ′ we must prove that R′u and R
′
v are neighbors if
and only if u, v ∈ V ′ are.
First, we need to show that there is no edge between R′u and R
′
v if v ∈ W1 \W2 and
u ∈ W2 \W1 since u and v are not neighbors in Γ′. This follows from the fact that u and
v were not neighbors in Γ′ and hence Ru and Rv were not neighbors in ΓD. Hence there
was a linear order Rw ∈ [Ru, Rv] between them. In D′ this linear order will be cloned to
R′w and, no matter how we place x and y there, we obtain R
′
w ∈ [R′u, R′v] since R′u and
R′v disagree on x and y. Hence R
′
u and R
′
v are not neighbors in ΓD′ as well. Secondly, we
have to check that R′v1 and R
′
v2 are linked by an edge since v
1 and v2 are neighbors in
Γ′. This holds because these orders differ in the ranking of just one pair of alternatives,
namely x and y, hence they are neighbors in ΓD′ . If w ∈ W1 ∩ W2 was a neighbor of
v ∈ W1 \W2 in Γ, then w1 is a neighbor of v in Γ′ but w2 is not. We then have that Rw
is a neighbor of Rv in ΓD. Then R′w1 will obviously be a neighbor of R
′
v in ΓD′ while R
′
w2
will not be a neighbor of R′v in ΓD′ since R
′
w1 will be between them. The remaining cases
are considered similarly.
To complete the induction step we need to prove that D′ is a Condorcet domain. We
use Theorem 1d) for that. We need to consider only triples of elements of X ′ that contain
x and y. Let {a, x, y} be such a triple. Since in orders of D′ elements x and y are always
standing together, a can never be in the middle. Hence conditions of Theorem 1d) are
satisfied and D′ is a Condorcet domain. 2
Clearwater et al. [2015] showed that for a median graph with k vertices we might
need exactly k alternatives to construct a closed Condorcet domain that has the given
graph as associated graph, with the star-graph representing the worst-case scenario. Thus,
Theorem 5 cannot be improved in this respect.
8We say that x and y are clones if they are neighbors in any linear order in the domain, cf. Elkind
et al. [2011, 2012].
13
Relation to the literature. We conclude this section by commenting on the relation
to Demange [2012]. She introduces profiles of preferences that are parametrized by a
median graph and derives the acyclicity of the majority relation from the requirement
of intermediateness (cf. Grandmont [1978]) of preferences. Specifically, she considers a
median graph with set of vertices V (identified with the set of voters), and a collection
{Rv ∈ R(X) : v ∈ V } of linear orders and assumes that, for all v, v′, u ∈ V , the following
condition is satisfied:
Ru ∈ [Rv, Rv′ ] whenever u is on a shortest path between v and v′. (3.2)
Lemma 3.1(i) above shows that, for every median domain D, the intermediateness condi-
tion (3.2) is always satisfied with respect to the geodesic betweenness of the underlying
graph ΓD. Thus, Theorem 4 above implies that in fact all closed Condorcet domains
are of the kind considered by Demange, and demonstrates the existence of a ‘canonical
parametrization’ of these domains (namely by the induced graph ΓD). Finally, Demange
[2012] takes both the (median) graph and the corresponding profile as given. We show
that this does not impose any restriction on the graph since, by Theorem 5, for every
median graph there exists a domain satisfying the intermediateness requirement (3.2).9
4 Characterizing and Generalizing the
Single-Crossing Property
4.1 The Representative Voter Property
A representative voter for a given profile of linear orders is a voter, present in this profile,
whose preference coincides with the majority relation of the profile. We say that a domain
D has the representative voter property if in any odd profile composed of linear orders
from D admits a representative voter.
In this subsection, we prove that the single-crossing domains (cf. Example 1 above)
are exactly the median domains whose associated graphs are chains. From this, we obtain
that — with the exception of the Condorcet domains associated with the 4-cycle graph —
the single-crossing domains are the domains that have the representative voter property.
Proposition 4.1. A domain D ⊆ R(X) has the single-crossing property if and only if
its associated graph ΓD is a chain.
Proof. It is easily seen that, if D = {R1, . . . , Rm} is single-crossing with respect to the
linear order R1 > R2 > . . . > Rm, then the interval [Ri, Rj] for i < j consists of linear
orders Ri, Ri+1, . . . , Rj. Hence, the graph ΓD is given by the chain connecting Rj and
Rj+1 by an edge for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Conversely, suppose that D = {R1, . . . , Rm} is such that the associated graph ΓD is a
chain, say the one that connects Rj with Rj+1 by an edge for all j = 1, . . . ,m − 1. We
show that D is single-crossing with respect to the linear order R1 > R2 > . . . > Rm. By
9 In contrast to the present analysis, Demange [2012] also considers the generalization to weak orders.
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Lemma 3.1(iii), the geodesic betweenness in ΓD agrees with the Kemeny betweenness of
D as a subset of R(X), hence, if Rh, Rl ∈ D with l > h are such that xRhy and xRly,
then we also have xRjy for all j ∈ {h, . . . , l} and all x, y ∈ X. This implies that D has
the single-crossing property relative to the specified order. 2
Rothstein [1991] proved the sufficiency of the single-crossing property for the validity
of the representative voter property. The following result shows that the single-crossing
property is in fact ‘almost’ necessary.
Theorem 6. Let D ⊆ R(X) be a domain of linear orders on X. Then, D has the
representative voter property if and only if D is either a single-crossing domain, or D is
a closed Condorcet domain with exactly four elements such that the associated graph ΓD
is a 4-cycle.
Proof. Suppose that D has the representative voter property. Evidently, in this case D
is a closed Condorcet domain. By Theorem 4, the associated graph ΓD is median, and
by Lemma 3.1(i) the geodesic betweenness in ΓD agrees with the Kemeny betweenness
on D. We will show that all vertices of ΓD have degree at most 2. Suppose by way
of contradiction, that ΓD contains a vertex, say R, of degree at least 3. Consider any
profile ρ = (R1, R2, R3) consisting of three distinct neighbors of R. The majority relation
corresponding to ρ is the median Rmed(R1, R2, R3). Since the median graph ΓD does
not have 3-cycles, Ri and Rj cannot be neighbors for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, hence
Rmed(R1, R2, R3) = R. Since R is not an element of {R1, R2, R3} the representative voter
property is violated, a contradiction. Since ΓD is always connected (as a graph), the
absence of vertices of degree 3 or more implies that ΓD is either a cycle or a chain. It
is well-known that among all cycles, only 4-cycles are a median graphs.10 On the other
hand, if ΓD is a chain, then D has the single-crossing property by Proposition 4.1.
To prove the converse, suppose first that D is a single-crossing domain. Then ΓD is
a chain by Proposition 4.1 and, evidently, the preference of the median voter in any odd
profile coincides with the corresponding majority relation; this is Rothstein’s theorem
(Rothstein [1991]). On the other hand, consider any odd profile over a domain D such
that the induced graph is a 4-cycle. In that case, the representative voter property holds
trivially if the profile contains all four different orders; if it contains at most three different
orders, the representative voter property follows as in the case of a chain with at most
three elements. 2
4.2 Generalizing the Single-Crossing Property to Trees
The classical single-crossing property [Mirrlees, 1971, Gans and Smart, 1996] naturally
generalizes to trees. We rephrase the definition suggested by Kung [2014] and Clearwater
et al. [2015] as follows.
10Clearly, a 3-cycle is not a median graph. Moreover, for any k ≥ 5, one can find three vertices v1, v2, v3
on a k-cycle such that the three shortest paths between any pair from v1, v2, v3 cover the entire cycle;
this implies that no vertex can simultaneously lie on all three shortest paths, i.e., that the triple v1, v2, v3
does not admit a median.
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Definition 2. A domain D ⊆ R(X) is single-crossing with respect to the tree T = (V,E)
if |D| = |V | and the linear orders of D can be parametrized by the vertices of T so
that the intermediateness condition (3.2) is satisfied. Moreover, we say that a domain is
generalized single-crossing if it is single-crossing with respect to some tree.
As is easily verified, a domain D is generalized single-crossing if and only if its associ-
ated graph ΓD is a tree. Indeed, if a domain D is single-crossing with respect to the tree
T , then ΓD = T . Conversely, if ΓD is a tree, then by Lemma 3.1(iii), the preferences of D
are intermediate on ΓD so D is generalized single-crossing. In particular, every general-
ized single-crossing domain is a closed Condorcet domain by Lemma 3.1(iii) (cf. Demange
[2012], Clearwater et al. [2015]).
To justify our terminology of ‘generalized single-crossingness,’ let D ⊆ R(X) be a
generalized single-crossing domain and suppose not all orders in D agree on the ranking
of x, y ∈ X, then the sets VDxy := {R ∈ D | xRy} and VDyx := {R ∈ D | yRx} are
both non-empty. In the tree ΓD, there will be a unique edge QR such that Q ∈ VDxy and
R ∈ VDyx; moreover, both sets VDxy and VDyx are convex, and VDxy ∪ VDyx = D. This justifies
the terminology
Example 3 (The single-crossing property on a tree). Consider domain D on the set
{a, b, c, d} consisting of four orders: Rˆ = abcd, R1 = acbd, R2 = abdc, and R3 = bacd. As
is easily seen, D is a closed Condorcet domain. The associated graph ΓD connects Rˆ with
each of the other three orders by an edge and the graph has no other edges (cf. Figure 4).
Thus, ΓD is a tree and Rˆ is the median order of any triple of distinct elements of D.
Figure 4: A generalized single-crossing domain
The following result characterizes the single-crossing property and its generalization
to trees directly in terms of the structure of the underlying domain, i.e., without explicit
reference to the associated graph.
Proposition 4.2. a) A domain D has the single-crossing property with respect to some
linear order on D if and only if, for all x, y, z, w ∈ X such that each of the sets VDxy, VDyx,
VDzw, and VDwz is non-empty, we have:
VDxy ⊆ VDzw or VDxy ⊆ VDwz. (4.1)
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b) Let F = {VDxy | x, y ∈ X}. A domain D has the generalized single-crossing property if
and only if F has the Helly property and, for all distinct x, y, z, w ∈ X, at least one of the
following four sets is empty:
VDxy ∩ VDzw, VDxy ∩ VDwz, VDyx ∩ VDzw, VDyx ∩ VDwz. (4.2)
Proof. a) Evidently, every single-crossing domain satisfies (4.1). To prove the converse,
we notice that this condition allows one to order the family of all sets of the form VDxy so
that, for an appropriate sequence of pairs of alternatives (a1, b1), . . . , (am, bm),
VDa1b1 ⊆ VDa2b2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ VDambm and VDb1a1 ⊇ VDb2a2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ VDbmam .
It is now easily verified that D has the single-crossing property with respect to any linear
order of the members of D which lists the elements of VDa1b1 first, then the elements ofVDa2b2 \ VDa1b1 second, and further lists elements of VDajbj \ VDaj−1bj−1 after listing VDaj−1bj−1 .
b) Suppose that D has the generalized single-crossing property. Then, ΓD is a tree. By
Lemma 3.1(iii), the betweenness on D coincides with the induced geodesic betweenness
on ΓD. In particular, D is a median domain, and as such satisfies the Helly property for
convex sets, and all elements of F are convex. To verify (4.2), assume by contradiction
that
P ∈ VDxy ∩ VDzw, Q ∈ VDxy ∩ VDwz, R ∈ VDyx ∩ VDzw, S ∈ VDyx ∩ VDwz,
for P,Q,R, S ∈ D. Consider a shortest path between P and R and a shortest path
between Q and S. The first path lies entirely in VDzw and the second one lies entirely in
VDwz; in particular, they do not intersect. But on each of them there is a switch from xy
to yx, and thus there exist two pairs of neighboring orders such that one of them is in VDxy
and the other one in VDyx. This contradicts the generalized single-crossing property.
Conversely, suppose that a domain D satisfies the Helly property and condition (4.2).
Proposition 2.2 then implies that D is a median domain, hence by Lemma 3.1(i), the
betweenness in D coincides with the geodesic betweenness in ΓD. By (4.2), ΓD is acyclic,
hence a tree, which implies the generalized single-crossing property, as desired. 2
5 Maximal Condorcet Domains Revisited
The problem of characterizing maximal Condorcet domains has received considerable
attention in the literature. Since every maximal Condorcet domain is closed, our analysis
allows one to address this problem by studying the structure of the associated median
graph. In particular, we will show that, if the median graph associated with a maximal
domain is acyclic, then it must, in fact, be a chain, i.e., among all trees only chains can
be associated with maximal Condorcet domains. On the other hand, it is well-known
that single-crossing domains are in general not maximal as Condorcet domains (see, e.g.,
Monjardet [2009]). However, occasionally this happens, and we provide a simple necessary
and sufficient condition for a single-crossing domain to be a maximal Condorcet domain.
Finally, we demonstrate by means of an example that even though the induced median
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graph of a maximal Condorcet domain is never a tree different from a chain, it does not
need to have the structure of a distributive lattice either (in view of Corollary 3.2 above,
such maximal Condorcet domain cannot contain two completely reversed orders).
If X has three elements, all maximal Condorcet domains have four elements and are
either of the type shown in Figure 2 (connected and single-crossing) or of the type shown
to the left of Figure 3 (not connected and cyclic). If |X| > 3, not all maximal Condorcet
domains on X have the same cardinality. Call a domain a maximum Condorcet domain
on X if it achieves the largest cardinality among all Condorcet domains on X. Evidently,
every maximum Condorcet domain is also maximal (and therefore closed), but not vice
versa. If X has four elements, the cardinality of a maximum Condorcet domain is known
to be 9, see Figure 5 for a domain attaining this number.
Figure 5: A connected maximum Condorcet domain on {a, b, c, d}
Note that the domain shown in Figure 5 is connected. Indeed, most of the known
general results about the size and the structure of maximal Condorcet domains pertain
to connected Condorcet domains; for instance, the domains described in Abello [1991],
Chameni-Nembua [1989], Danilov et al. [2012] and Galambos and Reiner [2008] are all
connected. However, not all maximal Condorcet domains are connected, as we have
already seen above. Figure 6 shows a maximal Condorcet domain with 8 elements on
{a, b, c, d} that is not connected; in fact, it belongs to the class of the so-called ‘symmetric’
Condorcet domains studied in Danilov and Koshevoy [2013]; a domain is called symmetric
if it contains with any order also its completely reversed order.
All examples of maximal Condorcet domains that we have given so far are either
single-crossing domains, or their associated graph contains at least one 4-cycle.11 As we
11It is well-known that every median graph that is not a tree contains at least one 4-cycle; this can be
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Figure 6: A non-connected maximal Condorcet domain on {a, b, c, d}
will see, this is a general feature of all maximal Condorcet domains. To show this we need
to do some preliminary work.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose D is generalized single-crossing and QR is an edge in ΓD. Suppose
P ∈ [Q,R] is different from Q and R. Then D′ = D ∪ {P} is also a generalised single-
crossing domain and, in particular, D is not a maximal Condorcet domain.
Proof. We add P to the graph splitting the edge QR, placing P in the middle. The
new graph will be still a tree and the preferences of D′ = D ∪ {P} will be intermediate
with respect to this tree, hence generalized single-crossing. In particular, D′ = D ∪ {P}
is a median domain and hence a closed Condorcet domain by Theorem 2. 2
We note that the lemma is specific to trees; if ΓD is a rectangle, the corresponding
statement would not hold as the right-hand side of Figure 3 shows.
Corollary 5.1. Any maximal generalized single-crossing domain on X is connected, i.e.,
is a subgraph of the permutohedron.
Now we can prove the first of the two main results of this section.
Theorem 7. Let D be a maximal Condorcet domain. If ΓD is a tree, it is, in fact, a
chain.
verified as in Footnote 10 above. Note that median graphs can contain also larger cycles (cf.Figure 5)
but these can never be ‘minimal’ (in an appropriate sense); every minimal cycle of any median graph is
a 4-cycle.
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Proof. Let D be a maximal Condorcet domain, and assume that ΓD is a tree but
not a chain. Then there exists a vertex R in ΓD of degree at least 3. Consider now
any three neighbors of R in ΓD, say R1, R2 and R3. Since, by Corollary 5.1, D is
connected, there are three distinct ordered pairs (xi, yi), i = 1, 2, 3, of alternatives such
that Ri = R\{(xi, yi)}∪{(yi, xi)}. We will say that Ri is obtained from R by switching the
pair of adjacent alternatives (xi, yi). Moreover, since in every pair (xi, yi), i = 1, 2, 3, the
alternatives are adjacent in R, there must exist at least two pairs that have no alternative
in common, say {x1, y1} ∩ {x2, y2} = ∅.
Now let R′ be the order that coincides with R except that both pairs (x1, y1) and
(x2, y2) in R
′ are switched, i.e., y1R′x1 and y2R′x2, and consider the domain D ∪ {R′}.
Since x1, y1 and x2, y2 are neighbors in each of the orders R, R1, R2, R
′, for every three
alternatives {a, b, c} no new order among them appears in R′ which has not yet occurred
in R, R1, or R2. Hence, by Theorem 1d), D ∪ {R′} is a Condorcet domain. By the
maximality of D, this implies R′ ∈ D. But in this case, the graph ΓD evidently contains
the 4-cycle {R,R1, R′, R2}, contradicting the assumed acyclicity ΓD. Hence, there cannot
exist a vertex of degree 3 or larger, i.e., ΓD is a chain. 2
Figure 4 (cf. Example 3 above) illustrates the proof of Theorem 7: one easily verifies
that the order badc can be added to the depicted domain D, creating a 4-cycle in the
associated graph ΓD; in particular, D is not maximal.
As we will see some – but by far not all – maximal single-crossing domains are also
maximal as Condorcet domains. Figure 5, however, shows instances of non-maximality:
the depicted maximal Condorcet domain contains four maximal single-crossing domains as
proper subdomains. The next result characterizes exactly when a maximal single-crossing
domain is also a maximal Condorcet domain.
To formulate the result, we need the following definitions. Let D ⊆ R(X) be a
maximal single-crossing domain and |X| = n. Then we know that the associated graph
ΓD is linear. By Corollary 5.1, it is a subgraph of the permutohedron. Let us enumerate
orders of D so that the edges of ΓD are R1R2, R2R3, . . . , Rm−1Rm. Then the sequence
{R1, . . . , Rm} will be called a maximal chain. Due to Lemma 5.1, each edge RiRi+1 in
ΓD has a unique switching pair of alternatives (xi, yi) which are adjacent in Ri. Due to
the (standard) single-crossing condition, once switched the pair is never switched back,
so for a two-element subset of alternatives {x, y} we cannot have both pairs (x, y) and
(y, x) as switching pairs. Moreover, R1 and Rm are completely reversed. Indeed, if Rm is
not R1, which is completely reversed R1, then we can add R1 at the end of the sequence
{R1, . . . , Rm} and add another vertex to our graph in contradiction to maximality of D.
Hence, m = (n−1)n
2
+ 1, so, in particular, all maximal chains are of the same length.
Without loss of generality we may assume that X = {1, 2, . . . , n} and R = R1 =
1 2 . . . n−1n and R = Rm = nn− 1 . . . 2 1. Traveling along the maximal chain R1, . . . , Rm
from R in direction of R alternatives in every 2-element subset {x, y}, where x < y
switch exactly once from xy to yx. That is, for each pair (x, y) ∈ X × X there exists
exactly one edge (Rj, Rj+1) such that xR1y, . . . , xRjy and yRj+1x, . . . , yRmx. We say
that this maximal chain satisfies the pairwise concatenation condition if the switching pairs
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Figure 7: A maximal chain constituting a maximal Condorcet domain on {a, b, c, d}
corresponding to any two adjacent edges have one alternative in common. Formally, a
maximal chain {R1, . . . , Rm} with switching pairs (xj, yj) of edges RjRj+1, j = 1, ...,m−1,
satisfies pairwise concatenation condition if
{xj, yj} ∩ {xj+1, yj+1} 6= ∅ (5.1)
for all j = 1, ...,m− 1. Note that the intersection in (5.1) then has exactly one element.
We note that the sequence of switching pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xm−1, ym−1) determines the
maximal chain {R1, . . . , Rm} uniquely.
To illustrate the pairwise concatenation condition consider Figure 7 which depicts a
single-crossing domain on X = {a, b, c, d} with m = 7. The maximal chain for this domain
is:
R1 = abcd, R2 = acbd, R3 = acdb, R4 = adcb, R5 = dacb, R6 = dcab, R7 = dcba,
with the sequence of switching pairs (b, c), (b, d), (c, d), (a, d), (a, c), (a, b), which obviously
satisfies the pairwise concatenation condition.
We will now show that the pairwise concatenation condition is necessary and sufficient
for a maximal single-crossing domain to be a maximal Condorcet domain.12
Definition 3 (Galambos and Reiner [2008]). Two maximal chains are equivalent if their
respective sequences of switching pairs can be transformed one to another by swapping
adjacent non-intersecting pairs.
12As we learned after completion of the first version of the present paper, Bernard Monjardet found
the same condition in his unpublished lecture notes Monjardet [2007] (without proof).
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It is easily verified that this notion indeed defines an equivalence relation on the class
of all maximal chains. To illustrate the definition, consider the maximum Condorcet
domain D on the set X = {a, b, c, d} depicted in Figure 5 above. The following sequence
is one of its maximal chains:
C1 := 〈 abcd, abdc, badc, bdac, dbac, dbca, dcba 〉
with the corresponding sequence of switching pairs
(d, c), (a, b), (a, d), (b, d), (a, c), (b, c). (5.2)
If one swaps the first two pairs in this sequence, i.e. (d, c) and (a, c), one obtains the
sequence of switching pairs corresponding to the equivalent maximal chain:
C2 := 〈 abcd, bacd, badc, bdac, dbac, dbca, dcba 〉 ,
which is also contained in the maximum domain D. If in the sequence (5.2), one switches
the fourth and fifth pair, i.e. (b, d) and (a, c), one obtains another equivalent maximal
chain of D:
C3 := 〈 abcd, abdc, badc, bdac, bdca, dbca, dcba 〉 .
Finally, if one switches both pairs in (5.2), first (d, c) against (a, b) and then (b, d) against
(a, c), one obtains the equivalent maximal chain:
C4 := 〈 abcd, bacd, badc, bdac, bdca, dbca, dcba 〉 .
Evidently, the maximum Condorcet domain D is the union of the pairwise equivalent
maximal chains C1, C2, C3, C4 that it contains. The following result due to [Galambos
and Reiner, 2008, Th. 2] shows that this is a general property of all maximal Condorcet
domains that contain at least one maximal chain.
Theorem 8 (Galambos and Reiner [2008]). Let D be a single-crossing domain and let
〈R1, . . . , Rm〉 be its corresponding maximal chain. Then the maximal Condorcet domain
containing D consists of all linear orders of all maximal chains equivalent to 〈R1, . . . , Rm〉.
We can now state the second main result of this section.
Theorem 9. A maximal single-crossing domain D ⊆ R(X) is a maximal Condorcet
domain if and only if the maximal chain corresponding to D satisfies the pairwise con-
catenation condition.
Proof. Let D be a maximal single-crossing domain and {R1, . . . , Rm} be the correspond-
ing maximal chain. To verify the necessity of the pairwise concatenation condition sup-
pose, by contraposition, that for two consecutive switching pairs (xj, yj) and (xj+1, yj+1)
one has {xj, yj} ∩ {xj+1, yj+1} = ∅. Without loss of generality assume that xjRjyj and
yjRj+1xj, as well as xj+1Rj+1yj+1 and yj+1Rj+2xj+1. Since {xj, yj} ∩ {xj+1, yj+1} = ∅,
both pairs of alternatives (xj, yj) and (xj+1, yj+1) must be adjacent in all three orderings
Rj, Rj+1, Rj+2, respectively. In particular, these three orders agree in the ranking of all
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Figure 8: A maximal Condorcet domain with no pair of completely reversed orders
pairs except for the two pairs (xj, yj) and (xj+1, yj+1), respectively. Consider the order R
′
that has xjR
′yj and yj+1R′xj+1 and agrees with each of Rj, Rj+1, Rj+2 in the ranking of all
other pairs. Clearly, R′ 6∈ D, but the restriction of R′ to any triple of distinct alternatives
coincides with the restriction of Rj, Rj+1, or Rj+2 to this triple. Hence, D ∪ {R′} is a
Condorcet domain by Theorem 1d), and thus D is not maximal. This demonstrates the
necessity of the pairwise concatenation condition.
The sufficiency of the pairwise concatenation condition follows from Theorem 8. In-
deed, it is easily seen that a maximal chain satisfying the pairwise concatenation condition
has no other maximal chain equivalent to it, i.e. it forms an equivalence class of its own.
By Theorem 8, the corresponding maximal single-crossing domain is a maximal Condorcet
domain. 2
In light of Theorem 7 and Corollary 3.2 above, a natural conjecture is that all maximal
Condorcet domains are distributive lattices. However, this turns out not to be true, as the
example in the following figure shows. The domain depicted in Figure 8 is connected and
maximal but not a distributive lattice; in view of Corollary 3.2 it clearly cannot contain
a pair of completely reversed orders.
It seems to be an interesting and worthwhile subject for future research to characterize
the class of median graphs that can arise as the associated graphs of maximal Condorcet
domains. However, this approach has to be complemented by other considerations as
well, since the graph alone does in general not contain information about maximality.
For instance, we have already seen that chains may be the associated graphs of maximal
Condorcet domains only if their length is one greater than a triangular number, i.e.,
1
2
(n− 1)n+ 1. Another example that illustrates this point quite drastically is the 4-cycle.
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We have already seen above that even non-median domains can induce a 4-cycle, albeit
the betweenness structures of the domain and the 4-cycle will not be the same (see the
domain in the middle of Figure 3). But even if we insist on them being isomorphic, thus
ensuring that the corresponding domain is a closed Condorcet domain, the 4-cycle may
or may not yield a maximal Condorcet domain. For instance, all 4-cycles in Figures 5, 6
and 8 evidently do not correspond to maximal Condorcet domains since they form proper
subdomains. But Figure 9 shows that the 4-cycle can also be the associated graph of a
maximal domain in R({a, b, c, d}). Such maximal domain of size 4 can be found in R(X)
for any cardinality of X, as shown by Danilov and Koshevoy [2013].
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Figure 9: A maximal Condorcet domain with four elements
6 Arrovian Aggregation and Strategy-Proof Social
Choice on Median Preference Domains
Closed Condorcet domains not only preclude intransitivities in pairwise majority voting,
they are also endowed with a large class of further aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s
independence condition. This follows from the analysis of Nehring and Puppe [2007,
2010]. Indeed, their main result entails a characterization of all Arrovian aggregators
on such domains under an additional monotonicity condition. In the first subsection
below, we apply their result to describe the class of all monotone Arrovian aggregators
on closed Condorcet domains. The monotonicity condition plays then a crucial role in
the construction of strategy-proof social choice functions on such domains in the second
subsection.
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6.1 Characterization of all Arrovian Aggregators
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of voters. An aggregator on a domain D ⊆ R(X) is a
mapping f : Dn → D that assigns an order in D to each profile of individual orders in D.
The following conditions on aggregators have been extensively studied in the literature.
Full Range. For all R ∈ D, there exist R1, . . . , Rn such that f(R1, . . . , Rn) = R.
Unanimity. For all R ∈ D, f(R, . . . , R) = R.
Independence. For all R1, . . . , Rn, R
′
1, . . . , R
′
n ∈ D and all pairs of distinct alternatives
x, y ∈ X, if xRy and, for all i ∈ N , [xRiy ⇔ xR′iy], then xR′y, where R = f(R1, . . . , Rn)
and R′ = f(R′1, . . . , R
′
n).
An aggregator is called Arrovian if it satisfies unanimity and independence. In what
follows, we will be concerned with Arrovian aggregators that satisfy in addition the fol-
lowing monotonicity condition.
Monotonicity For all R1, . . . , Rn, R
′
i ∈ D and all pairs of distinct alternatives x, y, if xR′y
and xRiy, then xRy, where R
′ = f(R1, . . . , R′i, . . . , Rn) and R = f(R1, . . . , Ri, . . . , Rn).
The monotonicity condition can be rephrased as follows. An aggregator f is monotone
if and only if, for all Ri, R
′
i ∈ D and all R−i ∈ Dn−1,
f(Ri, R−i) ∈ [Ri, f(R′i, R−i)] . (6.1)
This has the following interpretation. Consider any pair of distinct alternatives a and b,
and suppose that aRib according to agent i’s true order Ri. Then, if agent i can force the
social order to rank a above b by submitting some order R′i, the social order would also
rank a above b if agent i submitted his true preference Ri. In other words, no agent can
benefit in a pairwise comparison from any misrepresentation. The monotonicity condition
thus has a clear ‘non-manipulability’ flavor which we will further exploit.
The conjunction of independence and monotonicity is equivalent to the following sin-
gle condition.
Monotone Independence For all R1, . . . , Rn and for all pairs (x, y) of distinct alterna-
tives x, y ∈ X, if xRy, where R = f(R1, . . . , Rn) and [aRib ⇒ aR′ib] for all i ∈ N , then
aR′b, where R′ = f(R′1, . . . , R
′
n).
Note also that under monotonicity, unanimity can be deduced from the full range
condition, i.e., from the assumption that the aggregator is onto.
For every pair (x, y) ∈ X×X of distinct alternatives, letWxy be a non-empty collection
of non-empty subsets W ⊆ N of voters (the winning coalitions for x against y ) satisfying
[W ∈ Wxy and W ′ ⊇ W ] ⇒ W ′ ∈ Wxy. (6.2)
Definition 4. A collection W = {Wab | (a, b) ∈ X ×X, a 6= b } is called a structure of
winning coalitions if, for all distinct pairs of alternatives (x, y) ∈ X ×X,
W ∈ Wxy ⇔ W c 6∈ Wyx, (6.3)
where W c = N \W denotes the complement of the coalition W .
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Examples. There are numerous examples of structures of winning coalitions. The sim-
plest are the dictatorships which arise whenever there exists an individual i such that, for
all distinct pairs (x, y), a coalition W belongs toWxy if and only if i ∈ W . More generally,
an oligarchy is characterized by the existence of a non-empty set M of voters such that,
for all distinct pairs (x, y), either (i) W ∈ Wxy ⇔ M ⊆ W , or (ii) W ∈ Wyx ⇔ M ⊆ W .
Note that, by (6.3), if (i) holds, then {i} ∈ Wyx for all i ∈M ; similarly, if (ii) holds, then
{i} ∈ Wxy for all i ∈M .
A structure of winning coalitions is anonymous if, for any fixed pair (x, y) ∈ X ×X,
membership of a coalition W to Wxy depends only on the number of individuals in W . A
special case is pairwise majority voting which requires that for all pairs (x, y) ∈ X ×X of
distinct alternatives
W ∈ Wxy ⇔ |W | > n/2.
Note that this is jointly satisfiable with (6.3) only if n is odd.
Given a domain D ∈ R(X), a structure of winning coalitions is said to be order preserving
on D if, for every pair of distinct alternatives (x, y) ∈ X × X and every pair of distinct
alternatives (z, w) ∈ X ×X,
VDxy ⊆ VDzw ⇒ Wxy ⊆ Wzw. (6.4)
Observe that pairwise majority voting always defines an order preserving structure of
winning coalitions (since Wxy =Wzw for all distinct x, y and z, w in the case of pairwise
majority voting).
The following result is due to Nehring and Puppe [2007].
Proposition 6.1. Let D be a closed Condorcet domain and let W be any order preserv-
ing structure of winning coalitions on D. For all preference profiles (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn
there exists a unique order R∗ ∈ D such that, for every pair of distinct alternatives
(x, y) ∈ X ×X
xR∗y ⇔ {i ∈ N | xRiy} ∈ Wxy . (6.5)
The aggregator defined by (6.5) is a monotone Arrovian aggregator. Conversely, every
monotone Arrovian aggregator on D takes this form for some order preserving structure
of winning coalitions W.
Proof. The proof can be deduced from [Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Prop. 3.4]. For the
sake of the paper being self-contained, we reproduce the argument here, again emphasizing
the role of the Helly property on median domains as in the proof of Theorem 2 above.
For any profile (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn, define a binary relation R∗ by (6.5). First, we show
that R∗ ∈ D. Consider distinct x, y ∈ X and distinct z, w ∈ X such that xR∗y and zR∗w;
we will show that VDxy∩VDzw 6= ∅. By contradiction, suppose that this does not hold, then we
would obtain VDxy ⊆ VDwz, and in particular also {i ∈ N | xRiy} ⊆ {i ∈ N | wRiz}. At the
same time, we would haveWxy ⊆ Wwz because the structure of winning coalitions is order
preserving. Thus, {i ∈ N | xRiy} ∈ Wwz, hence also {i ∈ N | wRiz} ∈ Wwz. But the
latter contradicts zR∗w using (6.3). Thus, the collection of convex sets {VDxy | xR∗y} has
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pairwise non-empty intersections. By the Helly property for convex sets in any Condorcet
domain (Proposition 2.2), we obtain ⋂
{xR∗y}
VDxy 6= ∅,
which means that R∗ is an element of D. Thus, (6.5) indeed defines a mapping from Dn
to D. It is easily verified that it is onto, monotone and independent, i.e., an Arrovian
aggregator.
Conversely, let f be a monotone Arrovian aggregator. By the monotonicity and in-
dependence conditions, it is easily seen that f can be defined in terms of a structure
of winning coalitions as in (6.5). We thus have only to verify that the corresponding
structure of winning coalitions must be order preserving. Thus, assume that, for distinct
(x, y) ∈ X ×X and distinct (z, w) ∈ X ×X, we have VDxy ⊆ VDzw, and W ∈ Wxy. Then,
if the profile (R1, . . . , Rn) is such that all voters in W prefer x to y, we must have xRy
where R = f(R1, . . . , Rn). By assumption, all orders in D which rank x above y must
also rank z above w, hence zRw. By independence, this holds for all profiles in which the
agents in W rank x above y, hence also z above w, i.e., the agents in W are also winning
for z versus w. 2
6.2 Strategy-Proof Social Choice
It is well-known that on domains on which pairwise majority voting with an odd number
of voters is transitive, choosing the Condorcet winner yields a strategy-proof social choice
function (see, e.g., Lemma 10.3 in Moulin [1988]). In this final subsection, we use Propo-
sition 6.1 and property (6.1) which is entailed by monotonicity to construct a rich class
of further strategy-proof social choice functions on any closed Condorcet domain.
A social choice function F that maps every profile (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn to an element
F (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ X is strategy-proof if, for all i ∈ N , all Ri, R′i ∈ D and all R−i ∈ Dn−1,
[F (Ri, R−i)]Ri[F (R′i, R−i)],
i.e., if no voter can benefit by misrepresenting her true preferences.
For each order R ∈ R(X) denote by τ(R) ∈ X the top-ranked element of R. Let
D ⊆ R(X) be any closed Condorcet domain, and consider any order preserving structure
of winning coalitions W . For every profile (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn let RW ∈ D be the unique
order satisfying (6.5) for all distinct x, y ∈ X. Define a social choice function FW : Dn → X
by
FW(R1, ..., Rn) = τ(RW). (6.6)
Theorem 10. Let D ⊆ R(X) be any closed Condorcet domain. For every order preserving
structure of winning of coalitions W, the social choice function FW defined by (6.6) is
strategy-proof.
Proof. By Proposition 6.1, the aggregator fW : Dn → D that maps any profile
(R1, ..., Rn) to the social order RW according to (6.5) is a monotone Arrovian aggre-
gator; in particular, it satisfies (6.1). In other words, if we denote RW = fW(Ri, R−i)
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and R′W = fW(R
′
i, R−i), we have for all R1, ..., Rn, all i, all R
′
i, and all distinct pairs of
alternatives (x, y) ∈ X ×X,
[xRiy and xR
′
Wy] ⇒ xRWy (6.7)
This implies at once the strategy-proofness of FW , by contraposition. Indeed, suppose
that agent i could benefit by misreporting R′i, i.e., suppose that τ(R
′
W)Riτ(RW), where Ri
is agent i’s true preference order. Then, since τ(R′W) is the top element of the order R
′
W we
obtain from (6.7) , τ(R′W)RWτ(RW). Since τ(RW) is the top element of RW this implies
τ(R′W) = τ(RW), i.e., the misrepresentation does not change the chosen alternative. 2
In case of the classical single-crossing property, the anonymous social choice functions
defined by (6.6) are exactly the ones identified by Saporiti [2009]. Thus, in this special
case, the class of anonymous social choice functions considered in Theorem 10 exhausts all
anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions. It is an open and interesting question
whether this holds more generally on all closed Condorcet domains (and whether the
anonymity assumption is really necessary for this conclusion).
Appendix: Remaining Proofs
Lemma 3.1 is proven using a result by Bandelt and Chepoi [1996]. The statement of this
result requires some additional definitions, in particular the notion of a ‘geometric interval
operator,’ as follows. An interval operator on a (finite) set V is a mapping that assigns to
each pair (v, w) ∈ V × V a non-empty subset [v, w] ⊆ V , the interval spanned by v and
w, such that, for all v, w ∈ V , v ∈ [v, w] and [v, w] = [w, v]. An interval operator is called
geometric if it satisfies in addition the following properties. For all t, u, v, w ∈ V ,
[v, v] = {v}, (A.1)
u ∈ [v, w] ⇒ [v, u] ⊆ [v, w], (A.2)
t, u ∈ [v, w] & t ∈ [v, u] ⇒ u ∈ [t, w]. (A.3)
A pair v, w is called an edge if v 6= w and [v, w] = {v, w}. These edges form a graph
Γ on the vertex set V .
Lemma A.1. Consider a geometric interval operator on V , and let u ∈ [v, w]. Then,
there exist pairwise distinct t1, . . . , tm ∈ [v, w] such that t1 = v, tm = w, tk = u for some
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and such that
[t1, t2] ⊂ [t1, t3] ⊂ . . . ⊂ [t1, tm]
forms a maximal chain. In particular, the graph induced by a geometric interval operator
is connected.
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Proof. The existence of a maximal chain of the required form follows at once from
condition (A.2). The pairs tktk+1 must form an edge for k = 1, . . .m − 1 by maximality
of the chain. Thus, any two vertices are connected by a path. 2
An interval operator is called graphic if, for all u, v, w ∈ V , u ∈ [v, w] if and only if u is
geodesically between v and w in the induced graph Γ; note that this is exactly condition
(3.1) in Lemma 3.1 above. An interval operator is said to satisfy the triangle condition if,
for all triples u, v, w ∈ V such that
[u, v] ∩ [v, w] = {v} and [v, w] ∩ [w, u] = {w} and [w, u] ∩ [u, v] = {u}, (A.4)
all three intervals are edges whenever one of them is. Observe that (A.4) can be satisfied
only if either all three elements u, v, w coincide, or are pairwise distinct. The following
result is due to [Bandelt and Chepoi, 1996, Th.1].
Proposition A.1. Any geometric interval operator satisfying the triangle condition is
graphic.
We want to apply Proposition A.1 to prove Lemma 3.1. In order to do so, we first
verify the geometricity of the natural interval operator induced by every subdomain of
orders.
Lemma A.2. For any domain D ⊆ R(X), the interval operator that assigns to every
pair R,R′ ∈ D the interval [R,R′] ∩ D is geometric.
Proof. Properties (A.1) and (A.2) are easily verified. To verify the so-called ‘inversion
law’ (A.3), consider T, U, V,W ∈ D as required in the antecedent of (A.3). Let x, y ∈ X
be such that xTy and xWy. We have to show that then xUy. Since x, y were arbi-
trarily chosen, this would imply U ∈ [T,W ], as desired. Assume, by contradiction, that
yUx; then, we must have xV y since by assumption T ∈ [V, U ]. But this contradicts the
assumption that U ∈ [V,W ]. 2
The following proof of Lemma 3.1 shows that the triangle condition is a powerful
sufficient condition for an interval operator to be graphic, since it is indeed satisfied in all
three cases considered in Lemma 3.1 (sometimes vacuously).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (i) In case of a median domain, the triangle condition is vacuously
satisfied, since there can obviously be no triples of pairwise distinct elements satisfying
(A.4) by the median property. By Proposition A.1 the equivalence (3.1) is satisfied for
any median domain.
(ii) Next consider any connected domain D ⊆ R(X). There can exist triples satisfying
(A.4), but we shall show that in this case none of the three intervals can form an edge,
hence the triangle condition is again satisfied. Thus, suppose that the three pairwise
distinct orders U, V,W ∈ D satisfy (A.4) and, by contradiction, that one of the three
intervals is an edge, say [U, V ] = {U, V }. Since D is connected, there exists x, y ∈ X such
that U and V differ only in the ranking of x versus y, say xUy and yV x, while U and V
agree in the ranking of all other pairs of alternatives. There are two possibilities: either
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xWy or yWx. In the first case, we have U ∈ [V,W ] and hence ([U, V ]∩ [V,W ]) ⊇ {U, V };
in the second case, V ∈ [W,U ] and hence ([W,U ] ∩ [U, V ]) ⊇ {U, V }. In both cases,
we thus obtain a contradiction to assumption (A.4). By Proposition A.1 the equivalence
(3.1) is satisfied for D.
(iii) Finally, assume that D is such that ΓD is acyclic, i.e., a tree. As in part (i), we
show that there cannot exist triples satisfying (A.4) hence again the triangle condition is
satisfied vacuously.13 Assume, by way of contradiction, that the pairwise distinct orders
U, V,W ∈ D satisfy (A.4). By Lemma A.1, there exists a path piUV in ΓD connecting
U and V that stays entirely in [U, V ]; in particular, piUV does not contain W . Similarly,
there exists a path piVW in ΓD connecting V and W and staying entirely in [V,W ], and
a path piWU connecting W and U and staying entirely in [W,U ]. But then the union
piUV ∪ piVW ∪ piWU forms a cycle, which contradicts the assumed acyclicity of ΓD. Thus,
again, by Proposition A.1 the equivalence (3.1) is satisfied for the domain D. 2
Note that there do exist connected domainsD and pairwise distinct orders U, V,W ∈ D
satisfying condition (A.4). Examples are all triples of orders on a common 6-cycle with
pairwise distance of two such as, for instance, abc, bca, cab in Figure 2, or abcd, bcad, cabd
in Figure 5, etc.
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